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remove old api

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This commit is contained in:
Zhi Guan
2021-07-31 22:07:25 +08:00
parent f7b4533cdd
commit 2ecba70472
30 changed files with 1025 additions and 953 deletions
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224
src/tls.c
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@@ -322,7 +322,118 @@ int tls_record_length(const uint8_t *record)
}
int tls_cbc_encrypt(const SM3_HMAC_CTX *inited_hmac_ctx, const SM4_KEY *enc_key,
const uint8_t seq_num[8], const uint8_t header[5],
const uint8_t *in, size_t inlen, uint8_t *out, size_t *outlen)
{
SM3_HMAC_CTX hmac_ctx;
uint8_t last_blocks[32 + 16] = {0};
uint8_t *mac, *padding, *iv;
int rem, padding_len;
int i;
if (!inited_hmac_ctx || !enc_key || !seq_num || !header || (!in && inlen) || !out || !outlen) {
error_print();
return -1;
}
if (inlen > (1 << 14)) {
error_print("invalid tls record data length %zu\n", inlen);
return -1;
}
rem = (inlen + 32) % 16;
memcpy(last_blocks, in + inlen - rem, rem);
mac = last_blocks + rem;
memcpy(&hmac_ctx, inited_hmac_ctx, sizeof(SM3_HMAC_CTX));
sm3_hmac_update(&hmac_ctx, seq_num, 8);
sm3_hmac_update(&hmac_ctx, header, 5);
sm3_hmac_update(&hmac_ctx, in, inlen);
sm3_hmac_finish(&hmac_ctx, mac);
padding = mac + 32;
padding_len = 16 - rem - 1;
for (i = 0; i <= padding_len; i++) {
padding[i] = padding_len;
}
iv = out;
if (rand_bytes(iv, 16) != 1) {
error_print();
return -1;
}
out += 16;
if (inlen >= 16) {
sm4_cbc_encrypt(enc_key, iv, in, inlen/16, out);
out += inlen - rem;
iv = out - 16;
}
sm4_cbc_encrypt(enc_key, iv, last_blocks, sizeof(last_blocks)/16, out);
*outlen = 16 + inlen - rem + sizeof(last_blocks);
return 1;
}
int tls_cbc_decrypt(const SM3_HMAC_CTX *inited_hmac_ctx, const SM4_KEY *dec_key,
const uint8_t seq_num[8], const uint8_t enced_header[5],
const uint8_t *in, size_t inlen, uint8_t *out, size_t *outlen)
{
SM3_HMAC_CTX hmac_ctx;
const uint8_t *iv;
const uint8_t *padding;
const uint8_t *mac;
uint8_t header[5];
int padding_len;
int i;
if (!inited_hmac_ctx || !dec_key || !seq_num || !enced_header || !in || !inlen || !out || !outlen) {
error_print();
return -1;
}
if (inlen % 16
|| inlen < (16 + 0 + 32 + 16) // iv + data + mac + padding
|| inlen > (16 + (1<<14) + 32 + 256)) {
error_print("invalid tls cbc ciphertext length %zu\n", inlen);
return -1;
}
iv = in;
in += 16;
inlen -= 16;
sm4_cbc_decrypt(dec_key, iv, in, inlen/16, out);
padding_len = out[inlen - 1];
padding = out + inlen - padding_len - 1;
if (padding < out + 32) {
error_print();
return -1;
}
for (i = 0; i < padding_len; i++) {
if (padding[i] != padding_len) {
error_print("tls ciphertext cbc-padding check failure");
return -1;
}
}
*outlen = inlen - 32 - padding_len - 1;
header[0] = enced_header[0];
header[1] = enced_header[1];
header[2] = enced_header[2];
header[3] = (*outlen) >> 8;
header[4] = (*outlen);
mac = padding - 32;
memcpy(&hmac_ctx, inited_hmac_ctx, sizeof(SM3_HMAC_CTX));
sm3_hmac_update(&hmac_ctx, seq_num, 8);
sm3_hmac_update(&hmac_ctx, header, 5);
sm3_hmac_update(&hmac_ctx, out, *outlen);
if (sm3_hmac_finish_and_verify(&hmac_ctx, mac) != 1) {
error_print("tls ciphertext mac check failure");
return -1;
}
return 1;
}
// 这个函数应该是处理的，这个函数是不应该用的，通常我们在加密的时候，header ，明文数据是分离的，但是输出的record是一个
int tls_record_encrypt(const SM3_HMAC_CTX *hmac_ctx, const SM4_KEY *cbc_key,
@@ -378,6 +489,62 @@ int tls_random_generate(uint8_t random[32])
return 1;
}
int tls_prf(const uint8_t *secret, size_t secretlen, const char *label,
const uint8_t *seed, size_t seedlen,
const uint8_t *more, size_t morelen,
size_t outlen, uint8_t *out)
{
SM3_HMAC_CTX inited_hmac_ctx;
SM3_HMAC_CTX hmac_ctx;
uint8_t A[32];
uint8_t hmac[32];
size_t len;
if (!secret || !secretlen || !label || !seed || !seedlen
|| (!more && morelen) || !outlen || !out) {
error_print();
return -1;
}
sm3_hmac_init(&inited_hmac_ctx, secret, secretlen);
memcpy(&hmac_ctx, &inited_hmac_ctx, sizeof(SM3_HMAC_CTX));
sm3_hmac_update(&hmac_ctx, (uint8_t *)label, strlen(label));
sm3_hmac_update(&hmac_ctx, seed, seedlen);
sm3_hmac_update(&hmac_ctx, more, morelen);
sm3_hmac_finish(&hmac_ctx, A);
memcpy(&hmac_ctx, &inited_hmac_ctx, sizeof(SM3_HMAC_CTX));
sm3_hmac_update(&hmac_ctx, A, sizeof(A));
sm3_hmac_update(&hmac_ctx, (uint8_t *)label, strlen(label));
sm3_hmac_update(&hmac_ctx, seed, seedlen);
sm3_hmac_update(&hmac_ctx, more, morelen);
sm3_hmac_finish(&hmac_ctx, hmac);
len = outlen < sizeof(hmac) ? outlen : sizeof(hmac);
memcpy(out, hmac, len);
out += len;
outlen -= len;
while (outlen) {
memcpy(&hmac_ctx, &inited_hmac_ctx, sizeof(SM3_HMAC_CTX));
sm3_hmac_update(&hmac_ctx, A, sizeof(A));
sm3_hmac_finish(&hmac_ctx, A);
memcpy(&hmac_ctx, &inited_hmac_ctx, sizeof(SM3_HMAC_CTX));
sm3_hmac_update(&hmac_ctx, A, sizeof(A));
sm3_hmac_update(&hmac_ctx, (uint8_t *)label, strlen(label));
sm3_hmac_update(&hmac_ctx, seed, seedlen);
sm3_hmac_update(&hmac_ctx, more, morelen);
sm3_hmac_finish(&hmac_ctx, hmac);
len = outlen < sizeof(hmac) ? outlen : sizeof(hmac);
memcpy(out, hmac, len);
out += len;
outlen -= len;
}
return 1;
}
int tls_pre_master_secret_generate(uint8_t pre_master_secret[48], int version)
{
@@ -396,6 +563,63 @@ int tls_pre_master_secret_generate(uint8_t pre_master_secret[48], int version)
int tls_sign_server_ecdh_params(const SM2_KEY *server_sign_key,
const uint8_t client_random[32], const uint8_t server_random[32],
int curve, const SM2_POINT *point, uint8_t *sig, size_t *siglen)
{
uint8_t server_ecdh_params[69];
SM2_SIGN_CTX sign_ctx;
if (!server_sign_key || !client_random || !server_random
|| curve != TLS_curve_sm2p256v1 || !point || !sig || !siglen) {
error_print();
return -1;
}
server_ecdh_params[0] = TLS_curve_type_named_curve;
server_ecdh_params[1] = curve >> 8;
server_ecdh_params[2] = curve;
server_ecdh_params[3] = 65;
sm2_point_to_uncompressed_octets(point, server_ecdh_params + 4);
sm2_sign_init(&sign_ctx, server_sign_key, SM2_DEFAULT_ID);
sm2_sign_update(&sign_ctx, client_random, 32);
sm2_sign_update(&sign_ctx, server_random, 32);
sm2_sign_update(&sign_ctx, server_ecdh_params, 69);
sm2_sign_finish(&sign_ctx, sig, siglen);
return 1;
}
int tls_verify_server_ecdh_params(const SM2_KEY *server_sign_key,
const uint8_t client_random[32], const uint8_t server_random[32],
int curve, const SM2_POINT *point, const uint8_t *sig, size_t siglen)
{
int ret;
uint8_t server_ecdh_params[69];
SM2_SIGN_CTX verify_ctx;
if (!server_sign_key || !client_random || !server_random
|| curve != TLS_curve_sm2p256v1 || !point || !sig || !siglen
|| siglen > TLS_MAX_SIGNATURE_SIZE) {
error_print();
return -1;
}
server_ecdh_params[0] = TLS_curve_type_named_curve;
server_ecdh_params[1] = curve >> 8;
server_ecdh_params[2] = curve;
server_ecdh_params[3] = 65;
sm2_point_to_uncompressed_octets(point, server_ecdh_params + 4);
sm2_verify_init(&verify_ctx, server_sign_key, SM2_DEFAULT_ID);
sm2_verify_update(&verify_ctx, client_random, 32);
sm2_verify_update(&verify_ctx, server_random, 32);
sm2_verify_update(&verify_ctx, server_ecdh_params, 69);
ret = sm2_verify_finish(&verify_ctx, sig, siglen);
if (ret != 1) error_print();
return ret;
}
// handshakes