Revert "quantum init"

This reverts commit 53af3b51ae.
This commit is contained in:
Simon
2018-01-04 14:03:27 +08:00
parent 53af3b51ae
commit 38395c5c80
2361 changed files with 144430 additions and 387427 deletions

View File

@@ -1,65 +1,15 @@
/* crypto/srp/srp_vfy.c */
/*
* Written by Christophe Renou (christophe.renou@edelweb.fr) with the
* precious help of Peter Sylvester (peter.sylvester@edelweb.fr) for the
* EdelKey project and contributed to the OpenSSL project 2004.
*/
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright (c) 2004 The OpenSSL Project. All rights reserved.
*
* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
* are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
*
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
* distribution.
*
* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
* software must display the following acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit. (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
*
* 4. The names "OpenSSL Toolkit" and "OpenSSL Project" must not be used to
* endorse or promote products derived from this software without
* prior written permission. For written permission, please contact
* licensing@OpenSSL.org.
*
* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "OpenSSL"
* nor may "OpenSSL" appear in their names without prior written
* permission of the OpenSSL Project.
*
* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
* acknowledgment:
* "This product includes software developed by the OpenSSL Project
* for use in the OpenSSL Toolkit (http://www.OpenSSL.org/)"
*
* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE OpenSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE OpenSSL PROJECT OR
* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
* ====================================================================
*
* This product includes cryptographic software written by Eric Young
* (eay@cryptsoft.com). This product includes software written by Tim
* Hudson (tjh@cryptsoft.com).
*
* Copyright 2011-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
*
* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
*/
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SRP
# include "cryptlib.h"
# include "srp_lcl.h"
# include "internal/cryptlib.h"
# include <openssl/sha.h>
# include <openssl/srp.h>
# include <openssl/evp.h>
# include <openssl/buffer.h>
@@ -86,13 +36,10 @@ static int t_fromb64(unsigned char *a, size_t alen, const char *src)
int i, j;
int size;
if (alen == 0 || alen > INT_MAX)
return -1;
while (*src && (*src == ' ' || *src == '\t' || *src == '\n'))
++src;
size = strlen(src);
if (size < 0 || size >= (int)alen)
if (alen > INT_MAX || size > (int)alen)
return -1;
i = 0;
@@ -130,7 +77,7 @@ static int t_fromb64(unsigned char *a, size_t alen, const char *src)
if (--i < 0)
break;
}
while (j <= size && a[j] == 0)
while (a[j] == 0 && j <= size)
++j;
i = 0;
while (j <= size)
@@ -202,9 +149,9 @@ void SRP_user_pwd_free(SRP_user_pwd *user_pwd)
OPENSSL_free(user_pwd);
}
static SRP_user_pwd *SRP_user_pwd_new()
static SRP_user_pwd *SRP_user_pwd_new(void)
{
SRP_user_pwd *ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SRP_user_pwd));
SRP_user_pwd *ret = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*ret));
if (ret == NULL)
return NULL;
ret->N = NULL;
@@ -226,9 +173,9 @@ static void SRP_user_pwd_set_gN(SRP_user_pwd *vinfo, const BIGNUM *g,
static int SRP_user_pwd_set_ids(SRP_user_pwd *vinfo, const char *id,
const char *info)
{
if (id != NULL && NULL == (vinfo->id = BUF_strdup(id)))
if (id != NULL && NULL == (vinfo->id = OPENSSL_strdup(id)))
return 0;
return (info == NULL || NULL != (vinfo->info = BUF_strdup(info)));
return (info == NULL || NULL != (vinfo->info = OPENSSL_strdup(info)));
}
static int SRP_user_pwd_set_sv(SRP_user_pwd *vinfo, const char *s,
@@ -285,19 +232,19 @@ static SRP_user_pwd *srp_user_pwd_dup(SRP_user_pwd *src)
SRP_VBASE *SRP_VBASE_new(char *seed_key)
{
SRP_VBASE *vb = (SRP_VBASE *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SRP_VBASE));
SRP_VBASE *vb = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*vb));
if (vb == NULL)
return NULL;
if (!(vb->users_pwd = sk_SRP_user_pwd_new_null()) ||
!(vb->gN_cache = sk_SRP_gN_cache_new_null())) {
if ((vb->users_pwd = sk_SRP_user_pwd_new_null()) == NULL
|| (vb->gN_cache = sk_SRP_gN_cache_new_null()) == NULL) {
OPENSSL_free(vb);
return NULL;
}
vb->default_g = NULL;
vb->default_N = NULL;
vb->seed_key = NULL;
if ((seed_key != NULL) && (vb->seed_key = BUF_strdup(seed_key)) == NULL) {
if ((seed_key != NULL) && (vb->seed_key = OPENSSL_strdup(seed_key)) == NULL) {
sk_SRP_user_pwd_free(vb->users_pwd);
sk_SRP_gN_cache_free(vb->gN_cache);
OPENSSL_free(vb);
@@ -306,22 +253,22 @@ SRP_VBASE *SRP_VBASE_new(char *seed_key)
return vb;
}
int SRP_VBASE_free(SRP_VBASE *vb)
void SRP_VBASE_free(SRP_VBASE *vb)
{
if (!vb)
return;
sk_SRP_user_pwd_pop_free(vb->users_pwd, SRP_user_pwd_free);
sk_SRP_gN_cache_free(vb->gN_cache);
OPENSSL_free(vb->seed_key);
OPENSSL_free(vb);
return 0;
}
static SRP_gN_cache *SRP_gN_new_init(const char *ch)
{
unsigned char tmp[MAX_LEN];
int len;
SRP_gN_cache *newgN = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*newgN));
SRP_gN_cache *newgN =
(SRP_gN_cache *)OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SRP_gN_cache));
if (newgN == NULL)
return NULL;
@@ -329,7 +276,7 @@ static SRP_gN_cache *SRP_gN_new_init(const char *ch)
if (len < 0)
goto err;
if ((newgN->b64_bn = BUF_strdup(ch)) == NULL)
if ((newgN->b64_bn = OPENSSL_strdup(ch)) == NULL)
goto err;
if ((newgN->bn = BN_bin2bn(tmp, len, NULL)))
@@ -430,13 +377,14 @@ int SRP_VBASE_init(SRP_VBASE *vb, char *verifier_file)
* we add this couple in the internal Stack
*/
if ((gN = (SRP_gN *) OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(SRP_gN))) == NULL)
if ((gN = OPENSSL_malloc(sizeof(*gN))) == NULL)
goto err;
if (!(gN->id = BUF_strdup(pp[DB_srpid]))
|| !(gN->N =
SRP_gN_place_bn(vb->gN_cache, pp[DB_srpverifier]))
|| !(gN->g = SRP_gN_place_bn(vb->gN_cache, pp[DB_srpsalt]))
if ((gN->id = OPENSSL_strdup(pp[DB_srpid])) == NULL
|| (gN->N = SRP_gN_place_bn(vb->gN_cache, pp[DB_srpverifier]))
== NULL
|| (gN->g = SRP_gN_place_bn(vb->gN_cache, pp[DB_srpsalt]))
== NULL
|| sk_SRP_gN_insert(SRP_gN_tab, gN, 0) == 0)
goto err;
@@ -447,7 +395,8 @@ int SRP_VBASE_init(SRP_VBASE *vb, char *verifier_file)
}
} else if (pp[DB_srptype][0] == DB_SRP_VALID) {
/* it is a user .... */
SRP_gN *lgN;
const SRP_gN *lgN;
if ((lgN = SRP_get_gN_by_id(pp[DB_srpgN], SRP_gN_tab)) != NULL) {
error_code = SRP_ERR_MEMORY;
if ((user_pwd = SRP_user_pwd_new()) == NULL)
@@ -465,7 +414,7 @@ int SRP_VBASE_init(SRP_VBASE *vb, char *verifier_file)
if (sk_SRP_user_pwd_insert(vb->users_pwd, user_pwd, 0) == 0)
goto err;
user_pwd = NULL; /* abandon responsability */
user_pwd = NULL; /* abandon responsibility */
}
}
}
@@ -496,10 +445,8 @@ int SRP_VBASE_init(SRP_VBASE *vb, char *verifier_file)
SRP_user_pwd_free(user_pwd);
if (tmpdb)
TXT_DB_free(tmpdb);
if (in)
BIO_free_all(in);
TXT_DB_free(tmpdb);
BIO_free_all(in);
sk_SRP_gN_free(SRP_gN_tab);
@@ -524,7 +471,9 @@ static SRP_user_pwd *find_user(SRP_VBASE *vb, char *username)
return NULL;
}
#if OPENSSL_API_COMPAT < 0x10100000L
/*
* DEPRECATED: use SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user instead.
* This method ignores the configured seed and fails for an unknown user.
* Ownership of the returned pointer is not released to the caller.
* In other words, caller must not free the result.
@@ -533,6 +482,7 @@ SRP_user_pwd *SRP_VBASE_get_by_user(SRP_VBASE *vb, char *username)
{
return find_user(vb, username);
}
#endif
/*
* Ownership of the returned pointer is released to the caller.
@@ -543,7 +493,7 @@ SRP_user_pwd *SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user(SRP_VBASE *vb, char *username)
SRP_user_pwd *user;
unsigned char digv[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
unsigned char digs[SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH];
EVP_MD_CTX ctxt;
EVP_MD_CTX *ctxt = NULL;
if (vb == NULL)
return NULL;
@@ -567,18 +517,23 @@ SRP_user_pwd *SRP_VBASE_get1_by_user(SRP_VBASE *vb, char *username)
if (RAND_bytes(digv, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH) <= 0)
goto err;
EVP_MD_CTX_init(&ctxt);
EVP_DigestInit_ex(&ctxt, EVP_sha1(), NULL);
EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctxt, vb->seed_key, strlen(vb->seed_key));
EVP_DigestUpdate(&ctxt, username, strlen(username));
EVP_DigestFinal_ex(&ctxt, digs, NULL);
EVP_MD_CTX_cleanup(&ctxt);
if (SRP_user_pwd_set_sv_BN
(user, BN_bin2bn(digs, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, NULL),
BN_bin2bn(digv, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, NULL)))
ctxt = EVP_MD_CTX_new();
if (ctxt == NULL
|| !EVP_DigestInit_ex(ctxt, EVP_sha1(), NULL)
|| !EVP_DigestUpdate(ctxt, vb->seed_key, strlen(vb->seed_key))
|| !EVP_DigestUpdate(ctxt, username, strlen(username))
|| !EVP_DigestFinal_ex(ctxt, digs, NULL))
goto err;
EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctxt);
ctxt = NULL;
if (SRP_user_pwd_set_sv_BN(user,
BN_bin2bn(digs, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, NULL),
BN_bin2bn(digv, SHA_DIGEST_LENGTH, NULL)))
return user;
err:SRP_user_pwd_free(user);
err:
EVP_MD_CTX_free(ctxt);
SRP_user_pwd_free(user);
return NULL;
}
@@ -590,7 +545,8 @@ char *SRP_create_verifier(const char *user, const char *pass, char **salt,
{
int len;
char *result = NULL, *vf = NULL;
BIGNUM *N_bn = NULL, *g_bn = NULL, *s = NULL, *v = NULL;
const BIGNUM *N_bn = NULL, *g_bn = NULL;
BIGNUM *N_bn_alloc = NULL, *g_bn_alloc = NULL, *s = NULL, *v = NULL;
unsigned char tmp[MAX_LEN];
unsigned char tmp2[MAX_LEN];
char *defgNid = NULL;
@@ -601,12 +557,14 @@ char *SRP_create_verifier(const char *user, const char *pass, char **salt,
goto err;
if (N) {
if (!(len = t_fromb64(tmp, sizeof(tmp), N)))
if ((len = t_fromb64(tmp, sizeof(tmp), N)) <= 0)
goto err;
N_bn = BN_bin2bn(tmp, len, NULL);
if (!(len = t_fromb64(tmp, sizeof(tmp), g)))
N_bn_alloc = BN_bin2bn(tmp, len, NULL);
N_bn = N_bn_alloc;
if ((len = t_fromb64(tmp, sizeof(tmp) ,g)) <= 0)
goto err;
g_bn = BN_bin2bn(tmp, len, NULL);
g_bn_alloc = BN_bin2bn(tmp, len, NULL);
g_bn = g_bn_alloc;
defgNid = "*";
} else {
SRP_gN *gN = SRP_get_gN_by_id(g, NULL);
@@ -623,7 +581,7 @@ char *SRP_create_verifier(const char *user, const char *pass, char **salt,
s = BN_bin2bn(tmp2, SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN, NULL);
} else {
if (!(len = t_fromb64(tmp2, sizeof(tmp2), *salt)))
if ((len = t_fromb64(tmp2, sizeof(tmp2), *salt)) <= 0)
goto err;
s = BN_bin2bn(tmp2, len, NULL);
}
@@ -652,13 +610,9 @@ char *SRP_create_verifier(const char *user, const char *pass, char **salt,
result = defgNid;
err:
if (N) {
BN_free(N_bn);
BN_free(g_bn);
}
if (vf != NULL)
OPENSSL_cleanse(vf, vfsize);
OPENSSL_free(vf);
BN_free(N_bn_alloc);
BN_free(g_bn_alloc);
OPENSSL_clear_free(vf, vfsize);
BN_clear_free(s);
BN_clear_free(v);
return result;
@@ -674,7 +628,8 @@ char *SRP_create_verifier(const char *user, const char *pass, char **salt,
* BIGNUMS.
*/
int SRP_create_verifier_BN(const char *user, const char *pass, BIGNUM **salt,
BIGNUM **verifier, BIGNUM *N, BIGNUM *g)
BIGNUM **verifier, const BIGNUM *N,
const BIGNUM *g)
{
int result = 0;
BIGNUM *x = NULL;
@@ -688,9 +643,6 @@ int SRP_create_verifier_BN(const char *user, const char *pass, BIGNUM **salt,
(verifier == NULL) || (N == NULL) || (g == NULL) || (bn_ctx == NULL))
goto err;
srp_bn_print(N);
srp_bn_print(g);
if (*salt == NULL) {
if (RAND_bytes(tmp2, SRP_RANDOM_SALT_LEN) <= 0)
goto err;
@@ -711,13 +663,11 @@ int SRP_create_verifier_BN(const char *user, const char *pass, BIGNUM **salt,
goto err;
}
srp_bn_print(*verifier);
result = 1;
*salt = salttmp;
err:
if (*salt != salttmp)
if (salt != NULL && *salt != salttmp)
BN_clear_free(salttmp);
BN_clear_free(x);
BN_CTX_free(bn_ctx);