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This commit is contained in:
Zhi Guan
2015-08-15 15:02:15 +08:00
parent 06df2fab54
commit 3bdc0ea895
2536 changed files with 417052 additions and 271997 deletions
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154
crypto/ec/ec_cvt.c
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@@ -10,7 +10,7 @@
* are met:
*
* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
*
* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
@@ -58,7 +58,7 @@
/* ====================================================================
* Copyright 2002 Sun Microsystems, Inc. ALL RIGHTS RESERVED.
*
* Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
* Portions of the attached software ("Contribution") are developed by
* SUN MICROSYSTEMS, INC., and are contributed to the OpenSSL project.
*
* The Contribution is licensed pursuant to the OpenSSL open source
@@ -72,73 +72,109 @@
#include <openssl/err.h>
#include "ec_lcl.h"
#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
# include <openssl/fips.h>
#endif
EC_GROUP *EC_GROUP_new_curve_GFp(const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx)
{
const EC_METHOD *meth;
EC_GROUP *ret;
EC_GROUP *EC_GROUP_new_curve_GFp(const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *a,
const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx)
{
const EC_METHOD *meth;
EC_GROUP *ret;
meth = EC_GFp_nist_method();
ret = EC_GROUP_new(meth);
if (ret == NULL)
return NULL;
#ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
if (FIPS_mode())
return FIPS_ec_group_new_curve_gfp(p, a, b, ctx);
#endif
#if defined(OPENSSL_BN_ASM_MONT)
/*
* This might appear controversial, but the fact is that generic
* prime method was observed to deliver better performance even
* for NIST primes on a range of platforms, e.g.: 60%-15%
* improvement on IA-64, ~25% on ARM, 30%-90% on P4, 20%-25%
* in 32-bit build and 35%--12% in 64-bit build on Core2...
* Coefficients are relative to optimized bn_nist.c for most
* intensive ECDSA verify and ECDH operations for 192- and 521-
* bit keys respectively. Choice of these boundary values is
* arguable, because the dependency of improvement coefficient
* from key length is not a "monotone" curve. For example while
* 571-bit result is 23% on ARM, 384-bit one is -1%. But it's
* generally faster, sometimes "respectfully" faster, sometimes
* "tolerably" slower... What effectively happens is that loop
* with bn_mul_add_words is put against bn_mul_mont, and the
* latter "wins" on short vectors. Correct solution should be
* implementing dedicated NxN multiplication subroutines for
* small N. But till it materializes, let's stick to generic
* prime method...
* <appro>
*/
meth = EC_GFp_mont_method();
#else
meth = EC_GFp_nist_method();
#endif
if (!EC_GROUP_set_curve_GFp(ret, p, a, b, ctx))
{
unsigned long err;
err = ERR_peek_last_error();
ret = EC_GROUP_new(meth);
if (ret == NULL)
return NULL;
if (!(ERR_GET_LIB(err) == ERR_LIB_EC &&
((ERR_GET_REASON(err) == EC_R_NOT_A_NIST_PRIME) ||
(ERR_GET_REASON(err) == EC_R_NOT_A_SUPPORTED_NIST_PRIME))))
{
/* real error */
EC_GROUP_clear_free(ret);
return NULL;
}
/* not an actual error, we just cannot use EC_GFp_nist_method */
if (!EC_GROUP_set_curve_GFp(ret, p, a, b, ctx)) {
unsigned long err;
ERR_clear_error();
err = ERR_peek_last_error();
EC_GROUP_clear_free(ret);
meth = EC_GFp_mont_method();
if (!(ERR_GET_LIB(err) == ERR_LIB_EC &&
((ERR_GET_REASON(err) == EC_R_NOT_A_NIST_PRIME) ||
(ERR_GET_REASON(err) == EC_R_NOT_A_SUPPORTED_NIST_PRIME)))) {
/* real error */
ret = EC_GROUP_new(meth);
if (ret == NULL)
return NULL;
EC_GROUP_clear_free(ret);
return NULL;
}
if (!EC_GROUP_set_curve_GFp(ret, p, a, b, ctx))
{
EC_GROUP_clear_free(ret);
return NULL;
}
}
/*
* not an actual error, we just cannot use EC_GFp_nist_method
*/
return ret;
}
ERR_clear_error();
EC_GROUP_clear_free(ret);
meth = EC_GFp_mont_method();
EC_GROUP *EC_GROUP_new_curve_GF2m(const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *a, const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx)
{
const EC_METHOD *meth;
EC_GROUP *ret;
meth = EC_GF2m_simple_method();
ret = EC_GROUP_new(meth);
if (ret == NULL)
return NULL;
ret = EC_GROUP_new(meth);
if (ret == NULL)
return NULL;
if (!EC_GROUP_set_curve_GF2m(ret, p, a, b, ctx))
{
EC_GROUP_clear_free(ret);
return NULL;
}
if (!EC_GROUP_set_curve_GFp(ret, p, a, b, ctx)) {
EC_GROUP_clear_free(ret);
return NULL;
}
}
return ret;
}
return ret;
}
#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_EC2M
EC_GROUP *EC_GROUP_new_curve_GF2m(const BIGNUM *p, const BIGNUM *a,
const BIGNUM *b, BN_CTX *ctx)
{
const EC_METHOD *meth;
EC_GROUP *ret;
# ifdef OPENSSL_FIPS
if (FIPS_mode())
return FIPS_ec_group_new_curve_gf2m(p, a, b, ctx);
# endif
meth = EC_GF2m_simple_method();
ret = EC_GROUP_new(meth);
if (ret == NULL)
return NULL;
if (!EC_GROUP_set_curve_GF2m(ret, p, a, b, ctx)) {
EC_GROUP_clear_free(ret);
return NULL;
}
return ret;
}
#endif