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Update TLS crypto

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This commit is contained in:
Zhi Guan
2026-06-14 10:15:05 +08:00
parent 545e6a56f0
commit ec5705ae29
9 changed files with 137 additions and 145 deletions
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140
src/tls.c
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@@ -298,44 +298,6 @@ int tls_record_set_data(uint8_t *record, const uint8_t *data, size_t datalen)
return 1;
}
static void tls_cbc_encrypt_blocks(const BLOCK_CIPHER_KEY *key, uint8_t iv[16],
const uint8_t *in, size_t nblocks, uint8_t *out)
{
const uint8_t *piv = iv;
while (nblocks--) {
size_t i;
for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) {
out[i] = in[i] ^ piv[i];
}
block_cipher_encrypt(key, out, out);
piv = out;
in += 16;
out += 16;
}
memcpy(iv, piv, 16);
}
static void tls_cbc_decrypt_blocks(const BLOCK_CIPHER_KEY *key, uint8_t iv[16],
const uint8_t *in, size_t nblocks, uint8_t *out)
{
const uint8_t *piv = iv;
while (nblocks--) {
size_t i;
block_cipher_decrypt(key, in, out);
for (i = 0; i < 16; i++) {
out[i] ^= piv[i];
}
piv = in;
in += 16;
out += 16;
}
memcpy(iv, piv, 16);
}
int tls_cbc_encrypt(const HMAC_CTX *inited_hmac_ctx, const BLOCK_CIPHER_KEY *enc_key,
const uint8_t seq_num[8], const uint8_t header[5],
const uint8_t *in, size_t inlen, uint8_t *out, size_t *outlen)
@@ -348,7 +310,8 @@ int tls_cbc_encrypt(const HMAC_CTX *inited_hmac_ctx, const BLOCK_CIPHER_KEY *enc
int rem, padding_len;
int i;
if (!inited_hmac_ctx || !enc_key || !seq_num || !header || (!in && inlen) || !out || !outlen) {
if (!inited_hmac_ctx || !enc_key || !enc_key->cipher
|| !seq_num || !header || (!in && inlen) || !out || !outlen) {
error_print();
return -1;
}
@@ -385,10 +348,40 @@ int tls_cbc_encrypt(const HMAC_CTX *inited_hmac_ctx, const BLOCK_CIPHER_KEY *enc
out += 16;
if (inlen >= 16) {
tls_cbc_encrypt_blocks(enc_key, iv, in, inlen/16, out);
size_t nblocks = inlen/16;
switch (enc_key->cipher->oid) {
case OID_sm4:
sm4_cbc_encrypt_blocks(&enc_key->u.sm4_key, iv, in, nblocks, out);
break;
#ifdef ENABLE_AES
case OID_aes128:
case OID_aes256:
aes_cbc_encrypt_blocks(&enc_key->u.aes_key, iv, in, nblocks, out);
break;
#endif
default:
error_print();
return -1;
}
out += inlen - rem;
memcpy(iv, out - 16, 16);
}
switch (enc_key->cipher->oid) {
case OID_sm4:
sm4_cbc_encrypt_blocks(&enc_key->u.sm4_key, iv, last_blocks, sizeof(last_blocks)/16, out);
break;
#ifdef ENABLE_AES
case OID_aes128:
case OID_aes192:
case OID_aes256:
aes_cbc_encrypt_blocks(&enc_key->u.aes_key, iv, last_blocks, sizeof(last_blocks)/16, out);
break;
#endif
default:
error_print();
return -1;
}
tls_cbc_encrypt_blocks(enc_key, iv, last_blocks, sizeof(last_blocks)/16, out);
*outlen = 16 + inlen - rem + sizeof(last_blocks);
return 1;
}
@@ -407,14 +400,15 @@ int tls_cbc_decrypt(const HMAC_CTX *inited_hmac_ctx, const BLOCK_CIPHER_KEY *dec
size_t hmaclen;
int i;
if (!inited_hmac_ctx || !dec_key || !seq_num || !enced_header || !in || !inlen || !out || !outlen) {
if (!inited_hmac_ctx || !dec_key || !dec_key->cipher
|| !seq_num || !enced_header || !in || !inlen || !out || !outlen) {
error_print();
return -1;
}
if (inlen % 16
|| inlen < (16 + 0 + 32 + 16) // iv + data + mac + padding
|| inlen > (16 + (1<<14) + 32 + 256)) {
error_print_msg("invalid tls cbc ciphertext length %zu\n", inlen);
error_print();
return -1;
}
@@ -422,7 +416,21 @@ int tls_cbc_decrypt(const HMAC_CTX *inited_hmac_ctx, const BLOCK_CIPHER_KEY *dec
in += 16;
inlen -= 16;
tls_cbc_decrypt_blocks(dec_key, iv, in, inlen/16, out);
switch (dec_key->cipher->oid) {
case OID_sm4:
sm4_cbc_decrypt_blocks(&dec_key->u.sm4_key, iv, in, inlen/16, out);
break;
#ifdef ENABLE_AES
case OID_aes128:
case OID_aes192:
case OID_aes256:
aes_cbc_decrypt_blocks(&dec_key->u.aes_key, iv, in, inlen/16, out);
break;
#endif
default:
error_print();
return -1;
}
padding_len = out[inlen - 1];
padding = out + inlen - padding_len - 1;
@@ -432,7 +440,7 @@ int tls_cbc_decrypt(const HMAC_CTX *inited_hmac_ctx, const BLOCK_CIPHER_KEY *dec
}
for (i = 0; i < padding_len; i++) {
if (padding[i] != padding_len) {
error_puts("tls ciphertext cbc-padding check failure");
error_print();
return -1;
}
}
@@ -452,7 +460,7 @@ int tls_cbc_decrypt(const HMAC_CTX *inited_hmac_ctx, const BLOCK_CIPHER_KEY *dec
hmac_update(&hmac_ctx, out, *outlen);
hmac_finish(&hmac_ctx, hmac, &hmaclen);
if (gmssl_secure_memcmp(mac, hmac, sizeof(hmac)) != 0) {
error_puts("tls ciphertext mac check failure\n");
error_print();
return -1;
}
return 1;
@@ -502,6 +510,8 @@ int tls_gcm_encrypt(const BLOCK_CIPHER_KEY *key, const uint8_t fixed_iv[4],
break;
#ifdef ENABLE_AES
case OID_aes128:
case OID_aes192:
case OID_aes256:
if (aes_gcm_encrypt(&(key->u.aes_key), nonce, sizeof(nonce), aad, sizeof(aad),
in, inlen, out, GHASH_SIZE, gmac) != 1) {
error_print();
@@ -562,6 +572,8 @@ int tls_gcm_decrypt(const BLOCK_CIPHER_KEY *key, const uint8_t fixed_iv[4],
break;
#ifdef ENABLE_AES
case OID_aes128:
case OID_aes192:
case OID_aes256:
if (aes_gcm_decrypt(&(key->u.aes_key), nonce, sizeof(nonce), aad, sizeof(aad),
in, mlen, gmac, GHASH_SIZE, out) != 1) {
error_print();
@@ -624,6 +636,8 @@ int tls_ccm_encrypt(const BLOCK_CIPHER_KEY *key, const uint8_t fixed_iv[4],
#endif
#ifdef ENABLE_AES_CCM
case OID_aes128:
case OID_aes192:
case OID_aes256:
if (aes_ccm_encrypt(&(key->u.aes_key), nonce, sizeof(nonce), aad, sizeof(aad),
in, inlen, out, GHASH_SIZE, tag) != 1) {
error_print();
@@ -686,6 +700,8 @@ int tls_ccm_decrypt(const BLOCK_CIPHER_KEY *key, const uint8_t fixed_iv[4],
#endif
#ifdef ENABLE_AES_CCM
case OID_aes128:
case OID_aes192:
case OID_aes256:
if (aes_ccm_decrypt(&(key->u.aes_key), nonce, sizeof(nonce), aad, sizeof(aad),
in, mlen, tag, GHASH_SIZE, out) != 1) {
error_print();
@@ -715,24 +731,30 @@ int tls_random_generate(uint8_t random[32])
return 1;
}
int tls_prf(const uint8_t *secret, size_t secretlen, const char *label,
int tls_prf(const DIGEST *digest, const uint8_t *secret, size_t secretlen, const char *label,
const uint8_t *seed, size_t seedlen,
const uint8_t *more, size_t morelen,
size_t outlen, uint8_t *out)
{
HMAC_CTX inited_hmac_ctx;
HMAC_CTX hmac_ctx;
uint8_t A[32];
uint8_t hmac[32];
uint8_t A[DIGEST_MAX_SIZE];
uint8_t hmac[DIGEST_MAX_SIZE];
size_t len;
size_t hmaclen;
if (!secret || !secretlen || !label || !seed || !seedlen
if (!digest || !secret || !secretlen || !label || !seed || !seedlen
|| (!more && morelen) || !outlen || !out) {
error_print();
return -1;
}
if (digest->digest_size > sizeof(hmac) || !digest->digest_size) {
error_print();
return -1;
}
hmaclen = digest->digest_size;
hmac_init(&inited_hmac_ctx, DIGEST_sm3(), secret, secretlen);
hmac_init(&inited_hmac_ctx, digest, secret, secretlen);
memcpy(&hmac_ctx, &inited_hmac_ctx, sizeof(HMAC_CTX));
hmac_update(&hmac_ctx, (uint8_t *)label, strlen(label));
@@ -741,30 +763,30 @@ int tls_prf(const uint8_t *secret, size_t secretlen, const char *label,
hmac_finish(&hmac_ctx, A, &len);
memcpy(&hmac_ctx, &inited_hmac_ctx, sizeof(HMAC_CTX));
hmac_update(&hmac_ctx, A, sizeof(A));
hmac_update(&hmac_ctx, A, hmaclen);
hmac_update(&hmac_ctx, (uint8_t *)label, strlen(label));
hmac_update(&hmac_ctx, seed, seedlen);
hmac_update(&hmac_ctx, more, morelen);
hmac_finish(&hmac_ctx, hmac, &len);
len = outlen < sizeof(hmac) ? outlen : sizeof(hmac);
len = outlen < hmaclen ? outlen : hmaclen;
memcpy(out, hmac, len);
out += len;
outlen -= len;
while (outlen) {
memcpy(&hmac_ctx, &inited_hmac_ctx, sizeof(HMAC_CTX));
hmac_update(&hmac_ctx, A, sizeof(A));
hmac_update(&hmac_ctx, A, hmaclen);
hmac_finish(&hmac_ctx, A, &len);
memcpy(&hmac_ctx, &inited_hmac_ctx, sizeof(HMAC_CTX));
hmac_update(&hmac_ctx, A, sizeof(A));
hmac_update(&hmac_ctx, A, hmaclen);
hmac_update(&hmac_ctx, (uint8_t *)label, strlen(label));
hmac_update(&hmac_ctx, seed, seedlen);
hmac_update(&hmac_ctx, more, morelen);
hmac_finish(&hmac_ctx, hmac, &len);
len = outlen < sizeof(hmac) ? outlen : sizeof(hmac);
len = outlen < hmaclen ? outlen : hmaclen;
memcpy(out, hmac, len);
out += len;
outlen -= len;
@@ -3928,7 +3950,7 @@ int tls_handshake_digest_print(FILE *fp, int fmt, int ind, const char *label, co
return 1;
}
int tls_compute_verify_data(const uint8_t master_secret[48],
int tls_compute_verify_data(const DIGEST *digest, const uint8_t master_secret[48],
const char *label, const DIGEST_CTX *dgst_ctx, uint8_t verify_data[12])
{
const size_t master_secret_len = 48;
@@ -3937,7 +3959,7 @@ int tls_compute_verify_data(const uint8_t master_secret[48],
uint8_t dgst[64];
size_t dgstlen;
if (!master_secret || !dgst_ctx || !verify_data) {
if (!digest || !master_secret || !dgst_ctx || !verify_data) {
error_print();
return -1;
}
@@ -3947,7 +3969,7 @@ int tls_compute_verify_data(const uint8_t master_secret[48],
error_print();
return -1;
}
if (tls_prf(master_secret, master_secret_len,
if (tls_prf(digest, master_secret, master_secret_len,
label, // "client finished" or "server finished",
dgst, dgstlen, NULL, 0,
verify_data_len, verify_data) != 1) {