mirror of
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837 lines
28 KiB
Plaintext
837 lines
28 KiB
Plaintext
=pod
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=encoding utf8
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=head1 NAME
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verify - Utility to verify certificates
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=head1 SYNOPSIS
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B<gmssl> B<verify>
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[B<-help>]
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[B<-CAfile file>]
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[B<-CApath directory>]
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[B<-no-CAfile>]
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[B<-no-CApath>]
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[B<-allow_proxy_certs>]
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[B<-attime timestamp>]
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[B<-check_ss_sig>]
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[B<-CRLfile file>]
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[B<-crl_download>]
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[B<-crl_check>]
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[B<-crl_check_all>]
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[B<-engine id>]
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[B<-explicit_policy>]
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[B<-extended_crl>]
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[B<-ignore_critical>]
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[B<-inhibit_any>]
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[B<-inhibit_map>]
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[B<-no_check_time>]
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[B<-partial_chain>]
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[B<-policy arg>]
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[B<-policy_check>]
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[B<-policy_print>]
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[B<-purpose purpose>]
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[B<-suiteB_128>]
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[B<-suiteB_128_only>]
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[B<-suiteB_192>]
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[B<-trusted_first>]
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[B<-no_alt_chains>]
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[B<-untrusted file>]
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[B<-trusted file>]
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[B<-use_deltas>]
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[B<-verbose>]
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[B<-auth_level level>]
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[B<-verify_depth num>]
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[B<-verify_email email>]
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[B<-verify_hostname hostname>]
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[B<-verify_ip ip>]
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[B<-verify_name name>]
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[B<-x509_strict>]
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[B<-show_chain>]
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[B<->]
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[certificates]
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=head1 DESCRIPTION
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The B<verify> command verifies certificate chains.
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verify命令验证证书链。
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=head1 OPTIONS
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=over 4
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=item B<-help>
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Print out a usage message.
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打印使用信息。
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=item B<-CAfile file>
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A B<file> of trusted certificates.
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The file should contain one or more certificates in PEM format.
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可信证书文件。该文件应包含在一个或多个PEM格式的证书里。
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=item B<-CApath directory>
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A directory of trusted certificates. The certificates should have names
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of the form: hash.0 or have symbolic links to them of this
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form ("hash" is the hashed certificate subject name: see the B<-hash> option
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of the B<x509> utility). Under Unix the B<c_rehash> script will automatically
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create symbolic links to a directory of certificates.
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可信证书目录。 证书应具有以下格式的名称:hash.0或具有此表单的符号链接
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(“哈希”是散列的证书主题名称:请参阅x509实用程序的-hash选项)。 在Unix下,
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c_rehash脚本将自动创建到证书目录的符号链接。
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=item B<-no-CAfile>
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Do not load the trusted CA certificates from the default file location
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不要从默认文件位置加载受信任的CA证书。
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=item B<-no-CApath>
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Do not load the trusted CA certificates from the default directory location
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不要从默认目录位置加载受信任的CA证书。
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=item B<-allow_proxy_certs>
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Allow the verification of proxy certificates
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允许验证代理证书。
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=item B<-attime timestamp>
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Perform validation checks using time specified by B<timestamp> and not
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current system time. B<timestamp> is the number of seconds since
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01.01.1970 (UNIX time).
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使用由时间戳指定的时间而不是当前系统时间执行验证检查。 时间戳是自01.01.1970(UNIX时间)以来的秒数。
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=item B<-check_ss_sig>
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Verify the signature on the self-signed root CA. This is disabled by default
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because it doesn't add any security.
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验证自签名根CA上的签名。 这是默认禁用的,因为它不添加任何安全性。
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=item B<-CRLfile file>
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The B<file> should contain one or more CRLs in PEM format.
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This option can be specified more than once to include CRLs from multiple
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B<files>.
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文件应包含一个或多个PEM格式的CRL。 可以多次指定此选项以包含来自多个文件的CRL。
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=item B<-crl_download>
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Attempt to download CRL information for this certificate.
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尝试下载此证书的CRL信息。
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=item B<-crl_check>
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Checks end entity certificate validity by attempting to look up a valid CRL.
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If a valid CRL cannot be found an error occurs.
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通过尝试查找有效的CRL来检查终端实体证书的有效性。 如果找不到有效的CRL,则会发生错误。
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=item B<-crl_check_all>
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Checks the validity of B<all> certificates in the chain by attempting
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to look up valid CRLs.
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通过尝试查找有效的CRL来检查链中所有证书的有效性。
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=item B<-engine id>
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Specifying an engine B<id> will cause L<verify(1)> to attempt to load the
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specified engine.
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The engine will then be set as the default for all its supported algorithms.
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If you want to load certificates or CRLs that require engine support via any of
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the B<-trusted>, B<-untrusted> or B<-CRLfile> options, the B<-engine> option
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must be specified before those options.
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指定引擎ID将导致verify(1)尝试加载指定的引擎。 引擎将被设置为所有支持的算法的默认值。
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如果要通过任何-trusted,-untrusted或-CRLfile选项加载需要引擎支持的证书或CRL,
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则必须在这些选项之前指定-engine选项。
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=item B<-explicit_policy>
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Set policy variable require-explicit-policy (see RFC5280).
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设置策略变量require-explicit-policy(参见RFC5280)。
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=item B<-extended_crl>
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Enable extended CRL features such as indirect CRLs and alternate CRL
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signing keys.
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启用扩展CRL功能,如间接CRL和备用CRL签名密钥
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=item B<-ignore_critical>
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Normally if an unhandled critical extension is present which is not
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supported by GmSSL the certificate is rejected (as required by RFC5280).
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If this option is set critical extensions are ignored.
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通常如果GmSSL不支持未处理的关键扩展,那么证书将被拒绝(根据RFC5280的要求)。
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如果设置了此选项,则将忽略关键扩展。
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=item B<-inhibit_any>
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Set policy variable inhibit-any-policy (see RFC5280).
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设置策略变量suppress-any-policy(参见RFC5280)。
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=item B<-inhibit_map>
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Set policy variable inhibit-policy-mapping (see RFC5280).
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设置策略变量inhibit-policy-mapping(参见RFC5280)。
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=item B<-no_check_time>
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This option suppresses checking the validity period of certificates and CRLs
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against the current time. If option B<-attime timestamp> is used to specify
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a verification time, the check is not suppressed.
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此选项禁止根据当前时间检查证书和CRL的有效期。
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如果选项-attime时间戳用于指定验证时间,则不会抑制该检查。
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=item B<-partial_chain>
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Allow verification to succeed even if a I<complete> chain cannot be built to a
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self-signed trust-anchor, provided it is possible to construct a chain to a
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trusted certificate that might not be self-signed.
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即使完整的链不能构建一个自签署的信任锚点也可以允许验证成功,
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这可以构建一个链链接到一个不是自签署的受信任证书。
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=item B<-policy arg>
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Enable policy processing and add B<arg> to the user-initial-policy-set (see
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RFC5280). The policy B<arg> can be an object name an OID in numeric form.
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This argument can appear more than once.
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启用策略处理,并将arg添加到用户初始策略集(请参阅RFC5280)。
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策略参数可以是一个数字形式的OID的对象名称。 这个参数可能会出现不止一次。
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=item B<-policy_check>
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Enables certificate policy processing.
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启用证书策略处理。
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=item B<-policy_print>
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Print out diagnostics related to policy processing.
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打印与策略处理有关的诊断。
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=item B<-purpose purpose>
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The intended use for the certificate. If this option is not specified,
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B<verify> will not consider certificate purpose during chain verification.
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Currently accepted uses are B<sslclient>, B<sslserver>, B<nssslserver>,
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B<smimesign>, B<smimeencrypt>. See the B<VERIFY OPERATION> section for more
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information.
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证书的预期用途。 如果未指定此选项,验证将不会在链验证期间考虑证书目的。
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目前接受的用途是sslclient,sslserver,nssslserver,smimesign,smimeencrypt。
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有关详细信息,请参阅“验证操作”部分。
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=item B<-suiteB_128_only>, B<-suiteB_128>, B<-suiteB_192>
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enable the Suite B mode operation at 128 bit Level of Security, 128 bit or
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192 bit, or only 192 bit Level of Security respectively.
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See RFC6460 for details. In particular the supported signature algorithms are
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reduced to support only ECDSA and SHA256 or SHA384 and only the elliptic curves
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P-256 and P-384.
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启用Suite B模式操作,分别为128位安全级别,128位或192位或仅192位安全级别。
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有关详细信息,请参阅RFC6460。 特别地,支持的签名算法被减少以仅支持ECDSA
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和SHA256或SHA384,并且仅支持椭圆曲线P-256和P-384。
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=item B<-trusted_first>
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When constructing the certificate chain, use the trusted certificates specified
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via B<-CAfile>, B<-CApath> or B<-trusted> before any certificates specified via
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B<-untrusted>.
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This can be useful in environments with Bridge or Cross-Certified CAs.
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As of GmSSL 1.1.0 this option is on by default and cannot be disabled.
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在构建证书链时,请使用通过-CAfile指定的受信任证书,-CApath或-trusted,然后通过-rustrusted指定任何证书。
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这可以在具有桥接或交叉认证CA的环境中使用。 从GmSSL 1.1.0开始,默认情况下,该选项处于打开状态,无法禁用。
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=item B<-no_alt_chains>
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By default, unless B<-trusted_first> is specified, when building a certificate
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chain, if the first certificate chain found is not trusted, then GmSSL will
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attempt to replace untrusted issuer certificates with certificates from the
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trust store to see if an alternative chain can be found that is trusted.
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As of GmSSL 1.1.0, with B<-trusted_first> always on, this option has no
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effect.
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默认情况下,除非指定了-trusted_first,否则在构建证书链时,如果发现第一个证书链不受信任,
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则GmSSL将尝试用信任存储中的证书替换不受信任的颁发者证书,以查看是否可以找到可信任的替代链。
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从GmSSL 1.1.0开始,使用-trusted_first始终处于打开状态,此选项不起作用。
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=item B<-untrusted file>
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A B<file> of additional untrusted certificates (intermediate issuer CAs) used
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to construct a certificate chain from the subject certificate to a trust-anchor.
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The B<file> should contain one or more certificates in PEM format.
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This option can be specified more than once to include untrusted certificates
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from multiple B<files>.
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用于构建从主题证书到信任锚的证书链的其他不可信证书(中间颁发者CA)的文件。
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该文件应包含一个或多个PEM格式的证书。 可以多次指定此选项以包含来自多个文件的不受信任的证书。
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=item B<-trusted file>
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A B<file> of trusted certificates, which must be self-signed, unless the
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B<-partial_chain> option is specified.
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The B<file> contains one or more certificates in PEM format.
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With this option, no additional (e.g., default) certificate lists are
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consulted.
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That is, the only trust-anchors are those listed in B<file>.
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This option can be specified more than once to include trusted certificates
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from multiple B<files>.
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This option implies the B<-no-CAfile> and B<-no-CApath> options.
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This option cannot be used in combination with either of the B<-CAfile> or
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B<-CApath> options.
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可信证书的文件,必须是自签名的,除非指定了-partial_chain选项。 该文件包含一个或多个PEM格式的证书。
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使用此选项,不会查询附加(例如,默认)证书列表。 也就是说,唯一的信任锚是列出的文件。
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可以多次指定此选项以包含来自多个文件的可信证书。 此选项意味着-no-CAfile和-no-CApath选项。
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此选项不能与-CAfile或-CApath选项中的任何一个组合使用。
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=item B<-use_deltas>
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Enable support for delta CRLs.
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启用对delta CRL的支持。
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=item B<-verbose>
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Print extra information about the operations being performed.
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打印有关正在执行的操作的额外信息。
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=item B<-auth_level level>
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Set the certificate chain authentication security level to B<level>.
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The authentication security level determines the acceptable signature and
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public key strength when verifying certificate chains.
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For a certificate chain to validate, the public keys of all the certificates
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must meet the specified security B<level>.
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The signature algorithm security level is enforced for all the certificates in
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the chain except for the chain's I<trust anchor>, which is either directly
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trusted or validated by means other than its signature.
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See L<SSL_CTX_set_security_level(3)> for the definitions of the available
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levels.
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The default security level is -1, or "not set".
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At security level 0 or lower all algorithms are acceptable.
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Security level 1 requires at least 80-bit-equivalent security and is broadly
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interoperable, though it will, for example, reject MD5 signatures or RSA keys
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shorter than 1024 bits.
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将证书链认证安全级别设置为级别。 认证安全级别在验证证书链时确定可接受的签名和公开密钥强度。
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要验证证书链,所有证书的公钥必须满足指定的安全级别。 对链中的所有证书执行签名算法安全级别,
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除了该链的信任锚,其通过除签名之外的方式直接受信任或验证。 有关可用级别的定义,请参阅SSL_CTX_set_security_level(3)。
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默认安全级别为-1或“未设置”。 在0或更低的安全级别,所有算法都可以接受。 安全级别1需要至少80位等效的安全性,
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并且可以广泛地互操作,尽管它将例如拒绝MD5签名或短于1024位的RSA密钥。
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=item B<-verify_depth num>
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Limit the certificate chain to B<num> intermediate CA certificates.
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A maximal depth chain can have up to B<num+2> certificates, since neither the
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end-entity certificate nor the trust-anchor certificate count against the
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B<-verify_depth> limit.
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将证书链限制为中间CA证书。 最大深度链可以具有最多num + 2个证书,因为终端实体证书和信任锚证书都不符合-verify_depth限制。
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=item B<-verify_email email>
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Verify if the B<email> matches the email address in Subject Alternative Name or
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the email in the subject Distinguished Name.
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验证电子邮件是否匹配主题备用名称中的电子邮件地址或主题可分辨名称中的电子邮件。
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=item B<-verify_hostname hostname>
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Verify if the B<hostname> matches DNS name in Subject Alternative Name or
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Common Name in the subject certificate.
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验证主题名称是否匹配主题证书中主题备用名称或公用名称中的DNS名称。
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=item B<-verify_ip ip>
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Verify if the B<ip> matches the IP address in Subject Alternative Name of
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the subject certificate.
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验证IP匹配主题证书的主题备用名称中的IP地址。
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=item B<-verify_name name>
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Use default verification policies like trust model and required certificate
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policies identified by B<name>.
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The trust model determines which auxiliary trust or reject OIDs are applicable
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to verifying the given certificate chain.
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See the B<-addtrust> and B<-addreject> options of the L<x509(1)> command-line
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utility.
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Supported policy names include: B<default>, B<pkcs7>, B<smime_sign>,
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B<ssl_client>, B<ssl_server>.
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These mimics the combinations of purpose and trust settings used in SSL, CMS
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and S/MIME.
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As of GmSSL 1.1.0, the trust model is inferred from the purpose when not
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specified, so the B<-verify_name> options are functionally equivalent to the
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corresponding B<-purpose> settings.
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使用默认验证策略,如信任模型和由名称标识的所需证书策略。 信任模型确定哪些辅助信任或拒绝OID适用于验证给定的证书链。
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请参阅x509(1)命令行实用程序的-addtrust和-addreject选项。 支持的策略名称包括:default,pkcs7,smime_sign,ssl_client,ssl_server。
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这些模拟了SSL,CMS和S / MIME中使用的目的和信任设置的组合。 从GmSSL 1.1.0开始,从未指定的目的推断信任模型
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,因此-verify_name选项在功能上等同于相应的设置。
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=item B<-x509_strict>
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For strict X.509 compliance, disable non-compliant workarounds for broken
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certificates.
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对于严格的X.509合规性,请禁用破坏的证书的不符合标准的解决方法。
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=item B<-show_chain>
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Display information about the certificate chain that has been built (if
|
||
successful). Certificates in the chain that came from the untrusted list will be
|
||
flagged as "untrusted".
|
||
|
||
显示有关已建立的证书链的信息(如果成功)。 来自不受信任名单的链中的证书将被标记为“不受信任”。
|
||
|
||
=item B<->
|
||
|
||
Indicates the last option. All arguments following this are assumed to be
|
||
certificate files. This is useful if the first certificate filename begins
|
||
with a B<->.
|
||
|
||
表示最后一个选项。 以下所有参数都被认为是证书文件。 如果第一个证书文件名以 - 开头,这将非常有用。
|
||
|
||
=item B<certificates>
|
||
|
||
One or more certificates to verify. If no certificates are given, B<verify>
|
||
will attempt to read a certificate from standard input. Certificates must be
|
||
in PEM format.
|
||
|
||
一个或多个验证证书。 如果没有给出证书,验证将尝试从标准输入读取证书。 证书必须采用PEM格式。
|
||
|
||
=back
|
||
|
||
=head1 VERIFY OPERATION
|
||
|
||
The B<verify> program uses the same functions as the internal SSL and S/MIME
|
||
verification, therefore this description applies to these verify operations
|
||
too.
|
||
|
||
There is one crucial difference between the verify operations performed
|
||
by the B<verify> program: wherever possible an attempt is made to continue
|
||
after an error whereas normally the verify operation would halt on the
|
||
first error. This allows all the problems with a certificate chain to be
|
||
determined.
|
||
|
||
The verify operation consists of a number of separate steps.
|
||
|
||
Firstly a certificate chain is built up starting from the supplied certificate
|
||
and ending in the root CA.
|
||
It is an error if the whole chain cannot be built up.
|
||
The chain is built up by looking up the issuers certificate of the current
|
||
certificate.
|
||
If a certificate is found which is its own issuer it is assumed to be the root
|
||
CA.
|
||
|
||
The process of 'looking up the issuers certificate' itself involves a number of
|
||
steps.
|
||
After all certificates whose subject name matches the issuer name of the current
|
||
certificate are subject to further tests.
|
||
The relevant authority key identifier components of the current certificate (if
|
||
present) must match the subject key identifier (if present) and issuer and
|
||
serial number of the candidate issuer, in addition the keyUsage extension of
|
||
the candidate issuer (if present) must permit certificate signing.
|
||
|
||
The lookup first looks in the list of untrusted certificates and if no match
|
||
is found the remaining lookups are from the trusted certificates. The root CA
|
||
is always looked up in the trusted certificate list: if the certificate to
|
||
verify is a root certificate then an exact match must be found in the trusted
|
||
list.
|
||
|
||
The second operation is to check every untrusted certificate's extensions for
|
||
consistency with the supplied purpose. If the B<-purpose> option is not included
|
||
then no checks are done. The supplied or "leaf" certificate must have extensions
|
||
compatible with the supplied purpose and all other certificates must also be valid
|
||
CA certificates. The precise extensions required are described in more detail in
|
||
the B<CERTIFICATE EXTENSIONS> section of the B<x509> utility.
|
||
|
||
The third operation is to check the trust settings on the root CA. The root CA
|
||
should be trusted for the supplied purpose.
|
||
For compatibility with previous versions of GmSSL, a certificate with no
|
||
trust settings is considered to be valid for all purposes.
|
||
|
||
The final operation is to check the validity of the certificate chain. The validity
|
||
period is checked against the current system time and the notBefore and notAfter
|
||
dates in the certificate. The certificate signatures are also checked at this
|
||
point.
|
||
|
||
If all operations complete successfully then certificate is considered valid. If
|
||
any operation fails then the certificate is not valid.
|
||
|
||
=head1 DIAGNOSTICS
|
||
|
||
When a verify operation fails the output messages can be somewhat cryptic. The
|
||
general form of the error message is:
|
||
|
||
server.pem: /C=AU/ST=Queensland/O=CryptSoft Pty Ltd/CN=Test CA (1024 bit)
|
||
error 24 at 1 depth lookup:invalid CA certificate
|
||
|
||
The first line contains the name of the certificate being verified followed by
|
||
the subject name of the certificate. The second line contains the error number
|
||
and the depth. The depth is number of the certificate being verified when a
|
||
problem was detected starting with zero for the certificate being verified itself
|
||
then 1 for the CA that signed the certificate and so on. Finally a text version
|
||
of the error number is presented.
|
||
|
||
A partial list of the error codes and messages is shown below, this also
|
||
includes the name of the error code as defined in the header file x509_vfy.h
|
||
Some of the error codes are defined but never returned: these are described
|
||
as "unused".
|
||
|
||
=over 4
|
||
|
||
=item B<X509_V_OK>
|
||
|
||
The operation was successful.
|
||
|
||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_UNSPECIFIED>
|
||
|
||
Unspecified error; should not happen.
|
||
|
||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT>
|
||
|
||
The issuer certificate of a looked up certificate could not be found. This
|
||
normally means the list of trusted certificates is not complete.
|
||
|
||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL>
|
||
|
||
The CRL of a certificate could not be found.
|
||
|
||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CERT_SIGNATURE>
|
||
|
||
The certificate signature could not be decrypted. This means that the actual signature value
|
||
could not be determined rather than it not matching the expected value, this is only
|
||
meaningful for RSA keys.
|
||
|
||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECRYPT_CRL_SIGNATURE>
|
||
|
||
The CRL signature could not be decrypted: this means that the actual signature value
|
||
could not be determined rather than it not matching the expected value. Unused.
|
||
|
||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_DECODE_ISSUER_PUBLIC_KEY>
|
||
|
||
The public key in the certificate SubjectPublicKeyInfo could not be read.
|
||
|
||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_CERT_SIGNATURE_FAILURE>
|
||
|
||
The signature of the certificate is invalid.
|
||
|
||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_CRL_SIGNATURE_FAILURE>
|
||
|
||
The signature of the certificate is invalid.
|
||
|
||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_CERT_NOT_YET_VALID>
|
||
|
||
The certificate is not yet valid: the notBefore date is after the current time.
|
||
|
||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_CERT_HAS_EXPIRED>
|
||
|
||
The certificate has expired: that is the notAfter date is before the current time.
|
||
|
||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_CRL_NOT_YET_VALID>
|
||
|
||
The CRL is not yet valid.
|
||
|
||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_CRL_HAS_EXPIRED>
|
||
|
||
The CRL has expired.
|
||
|
||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_BEFORE_FIELD>
|
||
|
||
The certificate notBefore field contains an invalid time.
|
||
|
||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CERT_NOT_AFTER_FIELD>
|
||
|
||
The certificate notAfter field contains an invalid time.
|
||
|
||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_LAST_UPDATE_FIELD>
|
||
|
||
The CRL lastUpdate field contains an invalid time.
|
||
|
||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_ERROR_IN_CRL_NEXT_UPDATE_FIELD>
|
||
|
||
The CRL nextUpdate field contains an invalid time.
|
||
|
||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_OUT_OF_MEM>
|
||
|
||
An error occurred trying to allocate memory. This should never happen.
|
||
|
||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_DEPTH_ZERO_SELF_SIGNED_CERT>
|
||
|
||
The passed certificate is self-signed and the same certificate cannot be found in the list of
|
||
trusted certificates.
|
||
|
||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_SELF_SIGNED_CERT_IN_CHAIN>
|
||
|
||
The certificate chain could be built up using the untrusted certificates but the root could not
|
||
be found locally.
|
||
|
||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY>
|
||
|
||
The issuer certificate could not be found: this occurs if the issuer
|
||
certificate of an untrusted certificate cannot be found.
|
||
|
||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_VERIFY_LEAF_SIGNATURE>
|
||
|
||
No signatures could be verified because the chain contains only one certificate and it is not
|
||
self signed.
|
||
|
||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_CERT_CHAIN_TOO_LONG>
|
||
|
||
The certificate chain length is greater than the supplied maximum depth. Unused.
|
||
|
||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_CERT_REVOKED>
|
||
|
||
The certificate has been revoked.
|
||
|
||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_INVALID_CA>
|
||
|
||
A CA certificate is invalid. Either it is not a CA or its extensions are not consistent
|
||
with the supplied purpose.
|
||
|
||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED>
|
||
|
||
The basicConstraints pathlength parameter has been exceeded.
|
||
|
||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_INVALID_PURPOSE>
|
||
|
||
The supplied certificate cannot be used for the specified purpose.
|
||
|
||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_CERT_UNTRUSTED>
|
||
|
||
the root CA is not marked as trusted for the specified purpose.
|
||
|
||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_CERT_REJECTED>
|
||
|
||
The root CA is marked to reject the specified purpose.
|
||
|
||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_SUBJECT_ISSUER_MISMATCH>
|
||
|
||
not used as of GmSSL 1.1.0 as a result of the deprecation of the
|
||
B<-issuer_checks> option.
|
||
|
||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_AKID_SKID_MISMATCH>
|
||
|
||
Not used as of GmSSL 1.1.0 as a result of the deprecation of the
|
||
B<-issuer_checks> option.
|
||
|
||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_AKID_ISSUER_SERIAL_MISMATCH>
|
||
|
||
Not used as of GmSSL 1.1.0 as a result of the deprecation of the
|
||
B<-issuer_checks> option.
|
||
|
||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CERTSIGN>
|
||
|
||
Not used as of GmSSL 1.1.0 as a result of the deprecation of the
|
||
B<-issuer_checks> option.
|
||
|
||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_CRL_ISSUER>
|
||
|
||
Unable to get CRL issuer certificate.
|
||
|
||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_EXTENSION>
|
||
|
||
Unhandled critical extension.
|
||
|
||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_CRL_SIGN>
|
||
|
||
Key usage does not include CRL signing.
|
||
|
||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_UNHANDLED_CRITICAL_CRL_EXTENSION>
|
||
|
||
Unhandled critical CRL extension.
|
||
|
||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_INVALID_NON_CA>
|
||
|
||
Invalid non-CA certificate has CA markings.
|
||
|
||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_PROXY_PATH_LENGTH_EXCEEDED>
|
||
|
||
Proxy path length constraint exceeded.
|
||
|
||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_PROXY_SUBJECT_INVALID>
|
||
|
||
Proxy certificate subject is invalid. It MUST be the same as the issuer
|
||
with a single CN component added.
|
||
|
||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_KEYUSAGE_NO_DIGITAL_SIGNATURE>
|
||
|
||
Key usage does not include digital signature.
|
||
|
||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_PROXY_CERTIFICATES_NOT_ALLOWED>
|
||
|
||
Proxy certificates not allowed, please use B<-allow_proxy_certs>.
|
||
|
||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_INVALID_EXTENSION>
|
||
|
||
Invalid or inconsistent certificate extension.
|
||
|
||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_INVALID_POLICY_EXTENSION>
|
||
|
||
Invalid or inconsistent certificate policy extension.
|
||
|
||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_NO_EXPLICIT_POLICY>
|
||
|
||
No explicit policy.
|
||
|
||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_DIFFERENT_CRL_SCOPE>
|
||
|
||
Different CRL scope.
|
||
|
||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_EXTENSION_FEATURE>
|
||
|
||
Unsupported extension feature.
|
||
|
||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_UNNESTED_RESOURCE>
|
||
|
||
RFC 3779 resource not subset of parent's resources.
|
||
|
||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_PERMITTED_VIOLATION>
|
||
|
||
Permitted subtree violation.
|
||
|
||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_EXCLUDED_VIOLATION>
|
||
|
||
Excluded subtree violation.
|
||
|
||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_SUBTREE_MINMAX>
|
||
|
||
Name constraints minimum and maximum not supported.
|
||
|
||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_APPLICATION_VERIFICATION>
|
||
|
||
Application verification failure. Unused.
|
||
|
||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_CONSTRAINT_TYPE>
|
||
|
||
Unsupported name constraint type.
|
||
|
||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_CONSTRAINT_SYNTAX>
|
||
|
||
Unsupported or invalid name constraint syntax.
|
||
|
||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_UNSUPPORTED_NAME_SYNTAX>
|
||
|
||
Unsupported or invalid name syntax.
|
||
|
||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_CRL_PATH_VALIDATION_ERROR>
|
||
|
||
CRL path validation error.
|
||
|
||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_PATH_LOOP>
|
||
|
||
Path loop.
|
||
|
||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_VERSION>
|
||
|
||
Suite B: certificate version invalid.
|
||
|
||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_ALGORITHM>
|
||
|
||
Suite B: invalid public key algorithm.
|
||
|
||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_CURVE>
|
||
|
||
Suite B: invalid ECC curve.
|
||
|
||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_INVALID_SIGNATURE_ALGORITHM>
|
||
|
||
Suite B: invalid signature algorithm.
|
||
|
||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_LOS_NOT_ALLOWED>
|
||
|
||
Suite B: curve not allowed for this LOS.
|
||
|
||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_SUITE_B_CANNOT_SIGN_P_384_WITH_P_256>
|
||
|
||
Suite B: cannot sign P-384 with P-256.
|
||
|
||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_HOSTNAME_MISMATCH>
|
||
|
||
Hostname mismatch.
|
||
|
||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_EMAIL_MISMATCH>
|
||
|
||
Email address mismatch.
|
||
|
||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_IP_ADDRESS_MISMATCH>
|
||
|
||
IP address mismatch.
|
||
|
||
=item B<X509_V_ERR_DANE_NO_MATCH>
|
||
|
||
DANE TLSA authentication is enabled, but no TLSA records matched the
|
||
certificate chain.
|
||
This error is only possible in L<s_client(1)>.
|
||
|
||
=back
|
||
|
||
=head1 BUGS
|
||
|
||
Although the issuer checks are a considerable improvement over the old technique they still
|
||
suffer from limitations in the underlying X509_LOOKUP API. One consequence of this is that
|
||
trusted certificates with matching subject name must either appear in a file (as specified by the
|
||
B<-CAfile> option) or a directory (as specified by B<-CApath>). If they occur in both then only
|
||
the certificates in the file will be recognised.
|
||
|
||
Previous versions of GmSSL assume certificates with matching subject name are identical and
|
||
mishandled them.
|
||
|
||
Previous versions of this documentation swapped the meaning of the
|
||
B<X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT> and
|
||
B<X509_V_ERR_UNABLE_TO_GET_ISSUER_CERT_LOCALLY> error codes.
|
||
|
||
=head1 SEE ALSO
|
||
|
||
L<x509(1)>
|
||
|
||
=head1 HISTORY
|
||
|
||
The B<-show_chain> option was first added to GmSSL 1.1.0.
|
||
|
||
The B<-issuer_checks> option is deprecated as of GmSSL 1.1.0 and
|
||
is silently ignored.
|
||
|
||
=head1 COPYRIGHT
|
||
|
||
Copyright 2000-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
|
||
|
||
Licensed under the GmSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
|
||
this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
|
||
in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
|
||
L<https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html>.
|
||
|
||
=cut
|