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464 lines
15 KiB
C
464 lines
15 KiB
C
/* ====================================================================
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* Copyright (c) 2014 - 2017 The GmSSL Project. All rights reserved.
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*
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* Redistribution and use in source and binary forms, with or without
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* modification, are permitted provided that the following conditions
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* are met:
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*
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* 1. Redistributions of source code must retain the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer.
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*
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* 2. Redistributions in binary form must reproduce the above copyright
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* notice, this list of conditions and the following disclaimer in
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* the documentation and/or other materials provided with the
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* distribution.
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*
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* 3. All advertising materials mentioning features or use of this
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* software must display the following acknowledgment:
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* "This product includes software developed by the GmSSL Project.
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* (http://gmssl.org/)"
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*
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* 4. The name "GmSSL Project" must not be used to endorse or promote
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* products derived from this software without prior written
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* permission. For written permission, please contact
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* guanzhi1980@gmail.com.
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*
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* 5. Products derived from this software may not be called "GmSSL"
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* nor may "GmSSL" appear in their names without prior written
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* permission of the GmSSL Project.
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*
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* 6. Redistributions of any form whatsoever must retain the following
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* acknowledgment:
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* "This product includes software developed by the GmSSL Project
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* (http://gmssl.org/)"
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*
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* THIS SOFTWARE IS PROVIDED BY THE GmSSL PROJECT ``AS IS'' AND ANY
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* EXPRESSED OR IMPLIED WARRANTIES, INCLUDING, BUT NOT LIMITED TO, THE
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* IMPLIED WARRANTIES OF MERCHANTABILITY AND FITNESS FOR A PARTICULAR
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* PURPOSE ARE DISCLAIMED. IN NO EVENT SHALL THE GmSSL PROJECT OR
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* ITS CONTRIBUTORS BE LIABLE FOR ANY DIRECT, INDIRECT, INCIDENTAL,
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* SPECIAL, EXEMPLARY, OR CONSEQUENTIAL DAMAGES (INCLUDING, BUT
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* NOT LIMITED TO, PROCUREMENT OF SUBSTITUTE GOODS OR SERVICES;
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* LOSS OF USE, DATA, OR PROFITS; OR BUSINESS INTERRUPTION)
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* HOWEVER CAUSED AND ON ANY THEORY OF LIABILITY, WHETHER IN CONTRACT,
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* STRICT LIABILITY, OR TORT (INCLUDING NEGLIGENCE OR OTHERWISE)
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* ARISING IN ANY WAY OUT OF THE USE OF THIS SOFTWARE, EVEN IF ADVISED
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* OF THE POSSIBILITY OF SUCH DAMAGE.
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* ====================================================================
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*/
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/*
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* Copyright 2001-2016 The OpenSSL Project Authors. All Rights Reserved.
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*
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* Licensed under the OpenSSL license (the "License"). You may not use
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* this file except in compliance with the License. You can obtain a copy
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* in the file LICENSE in the source distribution or at
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* https://www.openssl.org/source/license.html
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*/
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#include <stdio.h>
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#include <openssl/evp.h>
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#include <openssl/rand.h>
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#include <openssl/crypto.h>
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#include <openssl/objects.h>
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#include "evp_locl.h"
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#include "internal/evp_int.h"
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#include "modes_lcl.h"
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#ifndef OPENSSL_NO_SMS4
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# include <openssl/sms4.h>
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typedef struct {
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union {
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double align;
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sms4_key_t ks;
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} ks; /* SMS4 key schedule to use */
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int key_set; /* Set if key initialised */
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int iv_set; /* Set if an iv is set */
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GCM128_CONTEXT gcm;
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unsigned char *iv; /* Temporary IV store */
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int ivlen; /* IV length */
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int taglen;
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int iv_gen; /* It is OK to generate IVs */
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int tls_aad_len; /* TLS AAD length */
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ctr128_f ctr;
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} EVP_SMS4_GCM_CTX;
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static int sms4_gcm_cleanup(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c)
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{
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EVP_SMS4_GCM_CTX *gctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_SMS4_GCM_CTX,c);
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OPENSSL_cleanse(&gctx->gcm, sizeof(gctx->gcm));
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if (gctx->iv != EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(c))
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OPENSSL_free(gctx->iv);
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return 1;
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}
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/* increment counter (64-bit int) by 1 */
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static void ctr64_inc(unsigned char *counter)
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{
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int n = 8;
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unsigned char c;
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do {
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--n;
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c = counter[n];
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++c;
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counter[n] = c;
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if (c)
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return;
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} while (n);
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}
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static int sms4_gcm_ctrl(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *c, int type, int arg, void *ptr)
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{
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EVP_SMS4_GCM_CTX *gctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_SMS4_GCM_CTX,c);
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switch (type) {
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case EVP_CTRL_INIT:
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gctx->key_set = 0;
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gctx->iv_set = 0;
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gctx->ivlen = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_length(c);
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gctx->iv = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(c);
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gctx->taglen = -1;
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gctx->iv_gen = 0;
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gctx->tls_aad_len = -1;
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return 1;
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case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_IVLEN:
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if (arg <= 0)
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return 0;
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/* Allocate memory for IV if needed */
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if ((arg > EVP_MAX_IV_LENGTH) && (arg > gctx->ivlen)) {
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if (gctx->iv != EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(c))
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OPENSSL_free(gctx->iv);
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gctx->iv = OPENSSL_malloc(arg);
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if (gctx->iv == NULL)
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return 0;
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}
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gctx->ivlen = arg;
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return 1;
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case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_SET_TAG:
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if (arg <= 0 || arg > 16 || EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(c))
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return 0;
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memcpy(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c), ptr, arg);
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gctx->taglen = arg;
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return 1;
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case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_GET_TAG:
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if (arg <= 0 || arg > 16 || !EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(c)
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|| gctx->taglen < 0)
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return 0;
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memcpy(ptr, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c), arg);
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return 1;
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case EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_FIXED:
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/* Special case: -1 length restores whole IV */
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if (arg == -1) {
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memcpy(gctx->iv, ptr, gctx->ivlen);
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gctx->iv_gen = 1;
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return 1;
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}
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/*
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* Fixed field must be at least 4 bytes and invocation field at least
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* 8.
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*/
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if ((arg < 4) || (gctx->ivlen - arg) < 8)
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return 0;
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if (arg)
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memcpy(gctx->iv, ptr, arg);
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if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(c)
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&& RAND_bytes(gctx->iv + arg, gctx->ivlen - arg) <= 0)
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return 0;
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gctx->iv_gen = 1;
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return 1;
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case EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN:
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if (gctx->iv_gen == 0 || gctx->key_set == 0)
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return 0;
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CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(&gctx->gcm, gctx->iv, gctx->ivlen);
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if (arg <= 0 || arg > gctx->ivlen)
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arg = gctx->ivlen;
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memcpy(ptr, gctx->iv + gctx->ivlen - arg, arg);
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/*
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* Invocation field will be at least 8 bytes in size and so no need
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* to check wrap around or increment more than last 8 bytes.
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*/
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ctr64_inc(gctx->iv + gctx->ivlen - 8);
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gctx->iv_set = 1;
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return 1;
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case EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_INV:
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if (gctx->iv_gen == 0 || gctx->key_set == 0
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|| EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(c))
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return 0;
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memcpy(gctx->iv + gctx->ivlen - arg, ptr, arg);
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CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(&gctx->gcm, gctx->iv, gctx->ivlen);
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gctx->iv_set = 1;
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return 1;
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case EVP_CTRL_AEAD_TLS1_AAD:
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/* Save the AAD for later use */
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if (arg != EVP_AEAD_TLS1_AAD_LEN)
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return 0;
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memcpy(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c), ptr, arg);
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gctx->tls_aad_len = arg;
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{
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unsigned int len =
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EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c)[arg - 2] << 8
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| EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c)[arg - 1];
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/* Correct length for explicit IV */
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len -= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
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/* If decrypting correct for tag too */
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if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(c))
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len -= EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN;
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EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c)[arg - 2] = len >> 8;
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EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(c)[arg - 1] = len & 0xff;
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}
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/* Extra padding: tag appended to record */
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return EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN;
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case EVP_CTRL_COPY:
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{
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EVP_CIPHER_CTX *out = ptr;
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EVP_SMS4_GCM_CTX *gctx_out = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_SMS4_GCM_CTX,out);
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if (gctx->gcm.key) {
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if (gctx->gcm.key != &gctx->ks)
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return 0;
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gctx_out->gcm.key = &gctx_out->ks;
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}
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if (gctx->iv == EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(c))
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gctx_out->iv = EVP_CIPHER_CTX_iv_noconst(out);
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else {
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gctx_out->iv = OPENSSL_malloc(gctx->ivlen);
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if (gctx_out->iv == NULL)
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return 0;
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memcpy(gctx_out->iv, gctx->iv, gctx->ivlen);
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}
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return 1;
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}
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default:
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return -1;
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}
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}
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static int sms4_gcm_init_key(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, const unsigned char *key,
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const unsigned char *iv, int enc)
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{
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EVP_SMS4_GCM_CTX *gctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_SMS4_GCM_CTX,ctx);
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if (!iv && !key)
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return 1;
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if (key) {
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do {
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(void)0; /* terminate potentially open 'else' */
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sms4_set_encrypt_key(&gctx->ks.ks, key);
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CRYPTO_gcm128_init(&gctx->gcm, &gctx->ks,
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(block128_f)sms4_encrypt);
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gctx->ctr = NULL;
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} while (0);
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/*
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* If we have an iv can set it directly, otherwise use saved IV.
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*/
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if (iv == NULL && gctx->iv_set)
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iv = gctx->iv;
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if (iv) {
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CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(&gctx->gcm, iv, gctx->ivlen);
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gctx->iv_set = 1;
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}
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gctx->key_set = 1;
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} else {
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/* If key set use IV, otherwise copy */
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if (gctx->key_set)
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CRYPTO_gcm128_setiv(&gctx->gcm, iv, gctx->ivlen);
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else
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memcpy(gctx->iv, iv, gctx->ivlen);
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gctx->iv_set = 1;
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gctx->iv_gen = 0;
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}
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return 1;
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}
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/*
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* Handle TLS GCM packet format. This consists of the last portion of the IV
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* followed by the payload and finally the tag. On encrypt generate IV,
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* encrypt payload and write the tag. On verify retrieve IV, decrypt payload
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* and verify tag.
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*/
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static int sms4_gcm_tls_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
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const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
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{
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EVP_SMS4_GCM_CTX *gctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_SMS4_GCM_CTX,ctx);
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int rv = -1;
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/* Encrypt/decrypt must be performed in place */
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if (out != in
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|| len < (EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN + EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN))
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return -1;
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/*
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* Set IV from start of buffer or generate IV and write to start of
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* buffer.
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*/
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if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_ctrl(ctx, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx) ?
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EVP_CTRL_GCM_IV_GEN : EVP_CTRL_GCM_SET_IV_INV,
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EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN, out) <= 0)
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goto err;
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/* Use saved AAD */
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if (CRYPTO_gcm128_aad(&gctx->gcm, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(ctx),
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gctx->tls_aad_len))
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goto err;
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/* Fix buffer and length to point to payload */
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in += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
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out += EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN;
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len -= EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN + EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN;
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if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx)) {
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/* Encrypt payload */
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if (gctx->ctr) {
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size_t bulk = 0;
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if (CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt_ctr32(&gctx->gcm,
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in + bulk,
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out + bulk,
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len - bulk, gctx->ctr))
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goto err;
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} else {
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size_t bulk = 0;
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if (CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt(&gctx->gcm,
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in + bulk, out + bulk, len - bulk))
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goto err;
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}
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out += len;
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/* Finally write tag */
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CRYPTO_gcm128_tag(&gctx->gcm, out, EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN);
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rv = len + EVP_GCM_TLS_EXPLICIT_IV_LEN + EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN;
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} else {
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/* Decrypt */
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if (gctx->ctr) {
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size_t bulk = 0;
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if (CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt_ctr32(&gctx->gcm,
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in + bulk,
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out + bulk,
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len - bulk, gctx->ctr))
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goto err;
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} else {
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size_t bulk = 0;
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if (CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt(&gctx->gcm,
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in + bulk, out + bulk, len - bulk))
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goto err;
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}
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/* Retrieve tag */
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CRYPTO_gcm128_tag(&gctx->gcm, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(ctx),
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EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN);
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/* If tag mismatch wipe buffer */
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if (CRYPTO_memcmp(EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(ctx), in + len,
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EVP_GCM_TLS_TAG_LEN)) {
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OPENSSL_cleanse(out, len);
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goto err;
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}
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rv = len;
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}
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err:
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gctx->iv_set = 0;
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gctx->tls_aad_len = -1;
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return rv;
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}
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static int sms4_gcm_cipher(EVP_CIPHER_CTX *ctx, unsigned char *out,
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const unsigned char *in, size_t len)
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{
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EVP_SMS4_GCM_CTX *gctx = EVP_C_DATA(EVP_SMS4_GCM_CTX,ctx);
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/* If not set up, return error */
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if (!gctx->key_set)
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return -1;
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if (gctx->tls_aad_len >= 0)
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return sms4_gcm_tls_cipher(ctx, out, in, len);
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if (!gctx->iv_set)
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return -1;
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if (in) {
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if (out == NULL) {
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if (CRYPTO_gcm128_aad(&gctx->gcm, in, len))
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return -1;
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} else if (EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx)) {
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if (gctx->ctr) {
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size_t bulk = 0;
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if (CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt_ctr32(&gctx->gcm,
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in + bulk,
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out + bulk,
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len - bulk, gctx->ctr))
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return -1;
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} else {
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size_t bulk = 0;
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if (CRYPTO_gcm128_encrypt(&gctx->gcm,
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in + bulk, out + bulk, len - bulk))
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return -1;
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}
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} else {
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if (gctx->ctr) {
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size_t bulk = 0;
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if (CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt_ctr32(&gctx->gcm,
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in + bulk,
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out + bulk,
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len - bulk, gctx->ctr))
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return -1;
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} else {
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size_t bulk = 0;
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if (CRYPTO_gcm128_decrypt(&gctx->gcm,
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in + bulk, out + bulk, len - bulk))
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return -1;
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}
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}
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return len;
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} else {
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if (!EVP_CIPHER_CTX_encrypting(ctx)) {
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if (gctx->taglen < 0)
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return -1;
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if (CRYPTO_gcm128_finish(&gctx->gcm,
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EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(ctx),
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gctx->taglen) != 0)
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return -1;
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gctx->iv_set = 0;
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return 0;
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}
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CRYPTO_gcm128_tag(&gctx->gcm, EVP_CIPHER_CTX_buf_noconst(ctx), 16);
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gctx->taglen = 16;
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/* Don't reuse the IV */
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gctx->iv_set = 0;
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return 0;
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}
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}
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# define SMS4_GCM_BLOCK_SIZE 1
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# define SMS4_GCM_IV_LENGTH 12
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# define SMS4_GCM_FLAGS (EVP_CIPH_FLAG_DEFAULT_ASN1 \
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| EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_IV | EVP_CIPH_FLAG_CUSTOM_CIPHER \
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| EVP_CIPH_ALWAYS_CALL_INIT | EVP_CIPH_CTRL_INIT \
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| EVP_CIPH_CUSTOM_COPY | EVP_CIPH_GCM_MODE \
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| EVP_CIPH_FLAG_AEAD_CIPHER)
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static const EVP_CIPHER sms4_gcm = {
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NID_sms4_gcm,
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SMS4_GCM_BLOCK_SIZE,
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SMS4_KEY_LENGTH,
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SMS4_GCM_IV_LENGTH,
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SMS4_GCM_FLAGS,
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sms4_gcm_init_key,
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sms4_gcm_cipher,
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sms4_gcm_cleanup,
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sizeof(EVP_SMS4_GCM_CTX),
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NULL, NULL, sms4_gcm_ctrl, NULL
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};
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const EVP_CIPHER *EVP_sms4_gcm(void) {
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return &sms4_gcm;
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}
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#endif /* OPENSSL_NO_SMS4 */
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